















































































































とになる。次のMoreno（2007: 47）の例をみれば明らかなように、fish や birds
という語もコンテクストによって異なる意味に解釈される。
（5） a. The fish attacked the swimmer.
b. The fish was nice but the potatoes were cold.
c. Please feed the fish in my room twice a day.
（6） a. I like listening to the birds in the morning.
b. The birds flew above the waves.






































































（11） a. There is a rectangle of lawn at the back.











（12） They [loose uses] do not have the striking quality that Grice associated
with floutings, which he saw as resulting in figurative or quasi-figurative
interpretations. Loose talk involves no overt violation, real or apparent; or at
least it does not involve a degree of overtness in real or apparent violation which
might trigger the search for an implicature.
Wilson & Sperber（2000: 224）
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（13） a. Robert is a bulldozer.
b. Sally is a block of ice.
c. That surgeon is a butcher.
Wilson & Carston（2006: 415）










（15） Specific uses of metaphors by individual authors or in given literary
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genres are indeed worthy of study, and so is the very idea of metaphor as a
culturally salient notion with a long, rich history. Still, we see metaphors as
simply a range of cases at one end of a continuum that includes literal, loose and
hyperbolic interpretations. In our view, metaphorical interpretations are
arrived at in exactly the same way as these other interpretations. There is no
mechanism specific to metaphors, no interesting generalisation that applies only
to them.
Sperber & Wilson（2006: 172）

















TO SLEEP* へと概念が拡張され、誇張法では PUT TO SLEEP**に、さらに隠
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（20） As Carston（1997, 2002a） has shown, narrowing and broadening often
combine to yield an adjusted concept that is narrower than the encoded concept
in some respects, and broader in others. In（4b）above, for instance（ʻBuying a
house is easy if youʼve got moneyʼ）, ʻmoneyʼ might be narrowed, on the one
hand, to exclude amounts of money that would be manifestly inadequate in the
circumstances, but also broadened to cover not only actual money holdings, but
also possessions such as land and art works with a suitable money value.
Wilson & Carston（2006: 411）
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れているのである。There is a rectangle of lawn at the back.という例文につい
て、Carston も語彙的縮小と語彙的拡張が同時に発生する可能性がある点を、
以下の通り指摘している。
（21） The encoded concept RECTANGLE is loosely used in（24a） [There is a
rectangle of lawn at the back.], since the lawn in question might have all sorts of
little irregularities that render it not strictly rectangular（i.e. not having four
right angles）. If the denotation of the RECTANGLE* includes all strict
rectangles along with other shapes that deviate to some limited degree from
strict rectangularity, then the relation between RECTANGLE and
RECTANGLE* is captured by the diagram in（22）. However, the denotation of
the ad hoc concept might include some cases of strict rectangles while
excluding others; it might, for instance, exclude those with two sides a mile long
and the other two only a few inches long, the relevant concept here being one

















える。さらに Carston は、次のようなもう 1つの場合を挙げている。
（23） Robert is a bulldozer.




られる。しかし、人間に対する特性を含まない bulldozer や block of ice の百科
事典的知識（encyclopaedic knowledge）から、このような意味を直接得ること
はできないと考えられる。前掲の Buying a house is easy if youʼve got money.の
moneyでは、拡張された概念は、金銭に関わるものに限られており、同一カテ
ゴリ内での拡張となっている。しかし、（23）や（24）では、ブルドーザーや氷












（26） Consider again BULLDOZER and BULLDOZER*. The logical entry for
the lexicalized concept BULLDOZER may contain an inference rule with the
output HEAVY MACHINERY OF A CERTAIN SORT, or something along
those lines, and its encyclopaedic entry includes information about its land-
clearing function, its effectiveness in mechanically pushing away large volumes
of earth, rocks and other debris, and about its physical appearance, perhaps
represented by a visual image of some sort. The components of the ad hoc
concept BULLDOZER* include representations of the properties mentioned
earlier: obstinacy and persistence, insensitivity to other peopleʼs feelings and
views, single-mindedness in pursuing personal interests, etc. Itʼs not clear to me
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whether a one-off ad hoc concept is usefully thought of as having a logical entry,
but for those people for whom BULLDOZER* has become a stable element of
their conceptual systems, the likely logical entry is HUMAN TEMPERAMENT
OFA CERTAIN SORT（this is certainly reflected in the many dictionaries that
give a second sense to the word ʻbulldozerʼ）. The entities in the world that fall
under these two concepts comprise disjoint sets.
Carston（2002a: 354）
しかしながら、この問題については、Wilson&Carston（2006） に基づいて再
検討してみる必要がある。たとえば、（24） Sally is a block of ice. が、次のよう
なコンテクストで発話されたとする。
（27） a. I had dinner with Sally last night.
b. Sheʼs a block of ice.
Wilson & Carston（2006: 425）
この発話によって、まず ʻFROZEN WATER OF A CERTAIN FORMʼ という
論理的素性と以下の百科事典的想定を持つ、符号化された概念 ʻBCLOCK OF
ICEʼ が活性化される。
（28） BLOCK OF ICE: Encyclopaedic assumptions
a. SQUARE, SOLID, HARD, COLD, RIGID, INFLEXIBLE, etc.;
b. DIFFICULT/UNPLEASANT TO TOUCH, COME CLOSE TO,
INTERRACT WITH, etc.;
c. MAKES THE SURROUNDING ATMOSPHERE UNCOMFORT-
ABLE, etc.;
d. MAKES PEOPLE WANT TO MOVE AWAY, etc.
Wilson & Carston（2006: 425）
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（29） 符号化された概念 BCLOCK OF ICE → 基本的な物理的概念 HARD,
COLD, RIGID → 拡張された上位概念 HARD*, COLD*, RIGID*
相互調整のプロセスを通して、話し手が断定する明意 Sally is a block of ICE*.
と、サリーは HARD*, COLD*, RIGID*であり、冷淡で、付き合いにくい相手な
ので、サリーとの食事を楽しめなかったという暗意を聞き手は復元することに
なる。この解釈のプロセスは、（23）Robert is a bulldozer. にも適用される。つ
まり、符号化された概念 BULLDOZER → 基本的な物理的概念 POWERFUL

































また最後に、語彙的拡張の例として、Sally is a block of ice. のように、Sallyのカ
テゴリと a block of ice のカテゴリが異なる隠喩の例を考察した。一見、a block
of ice の素性は、人間である Sallyには当てはまらないように思われるが、アド





























（32） Metaphorical interpretations are arrived at in exactly the same way as
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literal, loose and hyperbolic interpretations: there is no mechanism specific to
metaphors, and no interesting generalisation that applies only to them.
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Ad hoc concepts: lexical narrowing and lexical broadening
Toshihiro Okada
The linguistically encoded concept of a word is not the same as the one
communicated by the speaker, but only a clue to the communicated concept.
The encoded concept needs to go through the process of developing including
saturation and ad hoc concept construction. The ad hoc concept expressed by
use of the italicised word below, for instance, is more specific than the encoded
one, and therefore has a narrower denotation:
I have a temperature.
The speaker of this sentence might be understood as asserting not that she has
a normal temperature or any temperature at all, but that she has a temperature
above normal. The word temperature is used in a more specific sense than the
encoded one, and this is an example of lexical narrowing. The ad hoc concept
communicated by the speaker, on the other hand, may be more general than the
encoded concept, as in the examples below:
The glass is empty. (referring to the nearly empty glass) [approximation]
Sally is a block of ice. [metaphor]
These are examples of lexical broadening, where a word is used to convey a
more general sense than the encoded one, resulting in wider denotation. Lexical
narrowing and lexical broadening are two similar processes based on the same
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pragmatic principle, and they may cooccur, as Wilson & Carston (2006: 411)
claim that ʻnarrowing and broadening often combine to yield an adjusted
concept that is narrower than the encoded concept in some respects, and
broader in others.ʼ Approximation, hyperbole, and metaphor may all be seen as
varieties of lexical broadening (or both lexical broadening and narrowing), and
they are all interpreted in the same way through the relevance-guided mutual
adjustment process.
― 177 ―
